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1. Introduction 
 
Oil and gas wealth offers countries and regions the opportunity for national 
transformation, as in the case of, say, Norway or Qatar, but their economic and political 
systems are often distorted by the rent-seeking nature of the industry and they end up 
suffering from the ‘resource curse’ (Ross, 1999) while still finding it difficult to shift 
away from resource extraction. Simultaneously, virtually all nations have signed up to 
ambitious climate goals of keeping global average temperature rise below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels. A transition to renewable energy sources and low-carbon emission 
technologies are laid out in 2015 Paris Climate Agreement pledges, but these currently 
fall short of what is required to do so; even if the Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs) were to be achieved, this would only constitute around one third of what is 
required (UNEP, 2018). Global emissions in both 2017 and 2018 have increased (Jackson 
et al, 2018). Thus, research has found that keeping climate change below 2°C will be 
“highly unlikely” under the status quo (Raftery et al., 2017).  
 
To avoid temperatures rising above 2°C will require deep decarbonization, which 
includes not just the power sector and light-duty transportation, but also harder-to-reach 
sectors including heavy-goods, maritime and air transportation, heat, and energy-
intensive industries which will call for technologies like carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) (Davis et al., 2018). Although there have been efforts to develop roadmaps for 
100% renewable energy in many countries (Jacobson et al., 2017) and renewables remain 
popular, critics have expressed skepticism at the potential to achieve a purely renewable-
based solution (Clack et al., 2017).  
 
With the notable exception of Norway, most resource-rich economies tend to be laggards 
on climate action (Burck et al., 2018). Similarly, resource-rich regions (e.g., West 
Virginia in the US or Saskatchewan in Canada) have often acted to restrain or undermine 
national ambitions (Rabe, 2008; Besco, 2018; Carter, 2018; Hunter, 2019). Ultimately, a 
well of political and public support will be required to undertake measures that have 
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proven difficult in most major producers, so we seek to explore public sentiment on the 
subject in a country which has undertaken such a transition. 
 
As a case study, we explore public views of decarbonization in Scotland, which has been 
notably successful in setting an ambitious climate policy and transitioning to renewable 
energy, despite a longstanding history of fossil fuel extraction in the North Sea. The 
United Kingdom (UK) currently holds the second-highest oil and gas reserves in Europe, 
behind Norway (BP, 2017), virtually all of which is offshore of Scotland. However, 
climate and energy policies in the UK, and Scotland in particular, that aim to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have enabled a rapid transition to renewable energy 
sources. Scotland had reduced GHG emissions by 47% from its 1990 baseline levels as of 
2017 (Scottish Government, 2019) and produced 74.6% of its electricity from renewable 
sources by 2018 (Matthews and Scherr, 2019). Almost half of that reduction in emissions 
is a result of a 73.5% reduction in emissions in the energy sector even though it is only 
responsible for 15% of emissions.  By contrast, in the European Union (EU) as a whole, 
only 28.8% of its electricity was generated from renewables in 2015 (EEA, 2017).  
 
Over the past fifteen years, the UK has ratcheted its target of cutting greenhouse gas 
emissions from 60% to 80% and most recently to 100% below 1990 levels by 2050, i.e., 
net-zero emissions for the UK overall, similar to other national targets set in Sweden 
(2045) and Finland (2035) (Walker et al, 2019).  Individual countries within the UK can 
set their own targets and ‘reflecting its… circumstances’, the Committee on Climate 
Change has suggested that Scotland adopt an even more aggressive target to achieve net-
zero by 2045 (CCC, 2019).  
 
In this context, we explore how the general public in Scotland perceive their country’s 
path to decarbonization. Are members of the general public, even in regions where fossil 
fuel extraction is the predominant industry, supportive of the approach the government 
has taken? What are their views on climate policy, renewable energy, and other low-
carbon technologies in such as CCS and what are the policy implications of those views? 
We conducted focus groups and citizens’ juries in regions where the local economy is 
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highly reliant on fossil fuel extraction, and regions where the oil and gas industry employ 
a smaller proportion of the local population to determine whether public opinion on these 
subjects varies by location. These findings aim to serve as a case study of Scotland’s path 
to decarbonization and illuminate how other countries with a longstanding history of 
fossil fuel extraction may be able to rapidly decarbonize.  In the process, we explore the 
implications for policy-makers and project developers of engaging in such public 
engagement exercises.  
 
2. The Context for Scottish Energy and Climate Policy  
2.1. A Brief History of UK and Scottish Energy Policy   
Following a series of major discoveries in the North Sea off the northeast coast of 
Scotland in the 1970s, the UK became a major oil and gas producer (Kemp, 2011). From 
1981 to 2003, the UK became energy independent and was a leading global exporter 
(BEIS, 2018d). In 1999, oil production peaked at 6 million barrels and gas extraction 
peaked in 2001. Since then, there has been a gradual decline in production (with 
occasional upticks), with revenues fluctuating between £6 and £10 billion between 2004 
and 2013. (Scottish Government, 2018c). Although significant volumes of oil and gas 
continue to be extracted from the North Sea, since 2004, the UK has become a net 
importer of oil and gas, with the share of imports rising steadily to roughly 50% by the 
mid-2010s (BEIS, 2018d). With falling production, a major review led by Sir Ian Wood 
in 2014 sought to explore how to maximize economic recovery from the UK Continental 
Shelf (Kemp and Stephen, 2017). Simultaneously, both government and industry have 
increasingly focused on decommissioning oil and gas infrastructure, which is creating a 
burgeoning industry (Oil and Gas UK, 2018; McCauley, 2018).   
 
Since 1999, as a result of devolution, Scotland has had increased powers to legislate on 
matters related to environment (and transport, education, and some taxation powers), but 
other matters remain reserved for the UK government and Parliament in Westminster 
including energy, trade and industry. Thus, questions of energy and climate change policy 
cut across domains of responsibility of different levels of government.  
 
 5 
Given the volume of revenues at stake in the North Sea, unsurprisingly, control over 
those resources has played a central role in the imagination of Scottish nationalists, led by 
the Scottish National Party (SNP). Future revenues from the North Sea played an 
important role in the Scottish independence referendum campaign of 2014 since these 
revenues were seen as critical to the viability of an independent Scotland 
(Johnson and Phillips, 2012). In its topline summary report on government finances, the 
Scottish government (led by the SNP) continues to regularly present summary values for 
revenues as two figures – excluding and including North Sea revenue (Scottish 
Government, 2018c). 
 
Another important difference from the rest of the UK arose from the 1989 Electricity 
(Scotland) Act, which allowed for separate planning consent from England for both 
overhead transmission lines and large generation facilities including onshore wind farms. 
The Scottish government also operated its own distinct Renewables Obligation to 
promote renewable energy investments. As a result, Scotland, with a population one-tenth 
that of England, has more than double the onshore wind capacity (7.5 GW versus 3.1 
GW) (BEIS, 2018c).    
 
The power sector also benefited from the major gas resource discoveries, helping fuel the 
so-called ‘dash for gas’, which saw some 20 GW of new gas-fired capacity added over 
the course of the 1990s, largely at the expense of coal and so CO2 emissions began to fall 
dramatically (Newbery, 2005). Thus, by the time climate change targets were being 
debated in Europe and internationally in the mid-1990s, Britain was well situated to be a 
‘leader’ since its emissions were falling relative to 1990.   
 
2.2 Climate Policy in the UK 
Under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the EU pledged to reduce its overall greenhouse gas 
emissions by 8% below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, but the UK (along with 
Germany) took a disproportionately large share of that commitment by agreeing to a 
target of 21% below 1990 levels. The main elements of UK climate policy include 
participation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) which covers approximately 
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45% of EU emissions, as well as a series of domestic measures including a Climate 
Change Levy first implemented in 2001, followed by a series of Climate Change 
Agreements (Bowen and Rydge, 2011).  
 
However, it was the UK’s Climate Change Act of 2008 which set the legal framework for 
reducing GHG emissions in the UK by at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. The UK 
aims to accomplish this reduction in emissions by setting 5-year carbon budgets created 
by an independent Committee on Climate Change (CCC), which seeks to ensure the 
targets are met. In 2013, the UK introduced a carbon price support (CPS) which set a 
carbon price floor and has helped lead to the decline of coal-fired generation (House of 
Commons, 2018).  
 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, the UK had been a relative laggard in terms of renewables 
penetration (Kern et al, 2014). Since the mid-2000s, however, driven by the EU 
Renewables Directive which called for a 20% share of renewables in in total primary 
energy, the UK dramatically increased its ambition. The UK Government provided 
renewable support through a series of policies that have led to rapid growth in electricity 
generation capacity from onshore wind (12.85 GW), offshore wind (6.99 GW), solar 
(12.78 GW) and biomass (4.28 GW) (BEIS, 2018c). These critical policies have enabled 
the UK to become a global leader in reducing its GHG emissions. This was accomplished 
despite the British government ruling out the cheapest scalable renewable option in 
England – onshore wind development – due to opposition within the governing 
Conservative Party (Kirkup, 2015). 
 
As of 2017, UK GHG emissions have fallen by 43% from 1990 levels despite GDP rising 
by over 70% during this time (CCC, 2018a). Total GHG emissions in 2017 were 456 
MtCO2 equivalent, and reduction in emissions since 1990 can be primarily attributed to 
the reduction in the use of coal for energy production. However, the energy sector still 
remains the leading emitter in the UK, contributing 23% (BEIS, 2018a). The most recent 
CCC progress report to Parliament recommended that government take four key actions: 
support low-emissions reduction strategies (ex. wind and solar); create consistent policies 
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rather than “chopping and changing” them; set and enforce stricter standards (ex. fuel 
efficiency); and invest in long-term emissions reduction infrastructure (e.g., CCS) (CCC, 
2018a).   
 
Despite emissions reduction progress, the CCC found that meeting the fourth (2023-
2027) and fifth carbon budgets (2028-2032) without the use of CCS would be “highly 
challenging and likely to be much more costly to achieve” (CCC, 2018b). Moreover, 
although CCS is associated with the fossil fuel industry, the expectation has been that, if 
risk communications were done well, CCS facilities would be successfully sited 
(Lofstedt, 2015). 
 
2.3. Climate and Renewable Energy Policy in Scotland 
Scotland has sought to exceed the UK in its level of ambition on climate action (Royles 
& McEwen, 2015; McEwen & Bomberg, 2014). In the past decade, Scottish GHG 
emissions have been reduced significantly and renewable energy production has 
increased rapidly despite continued oil and gas extraction in the North Sea. Scotland’s 
Climate Act of 2009 established its own target of 42% reduction in GHG emissions by 
2020 in addition to the UK’s own 2050 target of an 80% reduction. The Act created a 
Scottish Committee on Climate Change which the Scottish Executive would need to heed 
in addition to the UK’s Committee on Climate Change.     
 
Scotland’s strategy to reduce GHG emissions includes an energy efficiency plan (Scottish 
Government, 2010b) and an 80% renewable electricity generation target by 2020 
(Scottish Government, 2010a). To ensure this goal would be achieved, a 2020 ‘routemap’ 
was developed, providing details related to phasing out nuclear energy, supporting 
innovation, training the workforce needed, investing in the grid, and identifying actions 
by sector (Scottish Government, 2011; Scottish Government, 2015). As part of its new 
Climate Change Plan, Scotland would set a goal to achieve 50% of its total energy for 
transportation, heat, and electricity from renewable sources by 2030 (Scottish 
Government, 2018d). Scotland’s low-carbon economic strategy aims to create 60,000 
green jobs as renewable energy production increases (Scottish Government, 2010a). 
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Unlike the British government, however, the Scottish government strongly supported a 
continued role for onshore wind while opposing any role for nuclear power as part of the 
portfolio (Scottish Government, 2017c).   
 
Most recently, the Scottish government introduced a bill in May 2018 proposing a 90% 
emissions reduction target by 2050, and 100% reduction “as soon as possible” (Scottish 
Parliament, 2018). Despite exceeding the UK government target, some environmental 
organizations have been critical of the bill, stating it is not ambitious enough (Keane, 
2018). Sweden, for example, has set a target of reaching net-zero emissions by 2045. The 
Environment Committee of the Scottish Parliament and groups such as the Church of 
Scotland and WWF-Scotland have supported a commitment to net-zero emissions 
(Carrell, 2019). The 2018 Committee on Climate Change report on reducing emissions in 
Scotland noted that emissions reduction in the power and waste sector has been 
significant, but little progress has been made in other sectors, particularly in agriculture, 
transportation, and for heating non-residential buildings (CCC, 2017; CCC, 2018c). 
 
The Scottish government has also been exploring the possibility of state enterprises in the 
energy sector. In October 2017, the First Minister Nicola Sturgeon pledged to establish a 
state-owned household energy supplier to compete with private electric and gas utilities 
and its design has been actively debated (Low, 2018). A consultancy report found that 
such a state-owned firm would cost £3.5 million to set up, £9 million in running costs and 
face stiff competition from as many as 42 other firms in the market (EY, 2018). 
Moreover, half of those firms (including two of the so-called Big 6) were loss-making. 
The report also highlighted that many in Scotland were particularly loyal to existing 
‘Scottish’ brands Scottish Power (owned by Iberdrola) and Scottish Hydro (owned by 
SSE). Moreover, some jurisdictions, such as Edinburgh and Aberdeen already have their 
own local energy companies to pursue options such as district heating (Fraser, 2018). 
 
2.4. Evolution of Energy Production, Consumption, and Emissions in Scotland 
Scotland’s evolution is one of continued abundance but shifting from fossil dominance to 
greater reliance on renewables.  Over 2009-2017, the share of renewables in gross final 
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energy consumption rose from 8% to 20% in Scotland.  By comparison, renewables’ 
share in the EU overall only increased from 12.6% to 17.5%, whereas in the England the 
share increased from 3.3% to 10.2% (Matthews and Scherr, 2019), This 12.5% 
percentage-point increase in Scotland was the second largest in the EU after Denmark 
(ibid).  
 
In 2018, 74.8% of its electricity generation came from renewable sources with a goal of 
100% by 2020 (Matthews and Scherr, 2019). The leading sources of renewables capacity 
were onshore wind (7.54 GW), and hydro (1.64 GW) followed by solar (310 MW), 
offshore wind (246 MW), and biomass (250 MW) although in terms of generation, hydro 
(5395 GWh) and biomass (1484 GWh) fare better than variable sources such as onshore 
wind (16860 GWh) and solar (275 GWh) (BEIS, 2018c). Carbon intensity of electricity 
has declined dramatically from 389.8 g CO2/kWh in 2000 to 150.6 g CO2/kWh in 2015 to 
54.4 g CO2/kWh in 2016 (Matthews and Scherr, 2019). Moving towards 2050, the 
Scottish government’s has placed greater emphasis on local energy generation (Scottish 
Government, 2017d). 
 
Scotland remains a major exporter although this now includes electricity – in 2016, 
13,736 ktoe of energy (13%) was for domestic consumption while 88,742 ktoe (87%) 
were exported or lost. Of the energy consumed in Scotland, 24% was used for electricity, 
25% for transportation, and 51% for heating, buildings and in industry in 2016 (Scottish 
Government, 2018c).  Scotland has also managed to surpass its energy efficiency goal of 
12% by 2020 – by 2015, it had reduced its energy consumption by 15.4% from its 
2005/2007 baseline. 
 
GHG emissions in the UK have fallen more rapidly than in any other major industrialised 
economy, dropping over 40% from 797 MtCO2,eq in 1990 to 471 MtCO2,eq in 2016 
(Brown et al., 2018).  Scotland’s emissions have decreased even more dramatically from 
75.6 MtCO2,eq in 1990 to 38.6 MtCO2,eq in 2016, a reduction of almost 50% and thereby 
exceeding the 42% target set in Scotland’s Climate Act several years early (Scottish 
Government, 2018c).  In 2009, Scotland set an ambitious target to reduce emissions by 
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42% from 1990 levels by 2020. By 2017, emissions had been reduced by 46.8% from 
1990 levels to 40.5 MtCO2eq, however, accounting for the Scotland’s participation in the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which is the formal basis for assessing its target, 
emissions were 46.1 MtCO2eq, which only translates to a 39% reduction from the 
baseline, just missing its annual target for 2017 established in the Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act 2009. 
 
2.5. CCS Technologies in the UK and Scotland 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated with high confidence 
that global climate change is not likely to be limited to 2°C without employing CCS 
technology (IPCC, 2014), a view echoed at the UK level with regard to meeting its 80% 
target for 2050 (RAEng, 2015; CCC, 2018b) The Scottish Government has stated it 
supports further development of CCS to mitigate climate change at the lowest cost 
(Scottish Government, 2017d). Moreover, energy firms would be well positioned to 
transition from resource extraction to CCS because of their subsurface expertise (Reiner, 
2019).  Past studies have found that Scots were less opposed to shifting away from fossil 
fuels and viewed oil in a less unfavourable light (Demski and Pidgeon, 2013).  
 
However, CCS deployment globally has been modest, particularly when compared to the 
4,000 million tonnes of CO2 that the International Energy Agency argued should be 
captured and stored in 2040 to stay under 2°C (IEA, 2016). As of November 2018 there 
were 18 large-scale CCS projects capturing almost 40 million tonnes per year, with 
current proposals for almost doubling the number and scale (Global CCS Institute, 2018), 
but the history of CCS development is littered with a litany of failures globally and in the 
UK (and Scotland) in particular (Reiner, 2016).  
 
The first major project announced for the UK was BP’s proposal in 2002 for its first 
‘decarbonized fossil’ plant (DF-1), to be carried out at Peterhead in northeast Scotland.  
The leader of the Scottish National Party and local member of parliament for the 
Peterhead, Alex Salmond, was an enthusiastic backer of the project and even many 
Greens were supportive (Banks, 2006), but ultimately it was cancelled by BP when the 
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British Government refused to ‘pick winners’ (Scrase and Watson, 2009; Bowen, 2011). 
In 2005, the UK had announced it would aim to become a global leader in demonstrating 
CCS technology following the House of Commons inquiry into CCS (House of 
Commons, 2006). After the collapse of BP’s Peterhead project, in 2007, the British 
Government launched a competition for the first CCS demonstration project competition, 
and in 2010, announced £1 billion would be available in capital funding, although 
competition was restricted to coal power plants. A project to retrofit Scottish Power’s 
coal-fired Longannet station was the last finalist standing in negotiations with the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) when the Department decided in 
October 2011 to terminate further negotiations. However, the £1 billion in funding would 
remain available through a new competition launched in 2012 (NAO, 2012) and DECC 
reaffirmed its commitment to support CCS deployment in its CCS Roadmap (DECC, 
2012). 
 
During the second competition to develop the UK’s first commercial-scale CCS projects, 
four projects were shortlisted in October 2012, and ultimately narrowed to two: one in 
Yorkshire in northern England and a new project in Peterhead led by Shell. The 
Peterhead Project would capture 1 million tonnes of CO2 per year from a combined cycle 
gas turbine (CCGT) (Cotton et al, 2017). However, on 25 November 2015, the British 
Government cancelled the competition without warning before it had reached a 
conclusion. The Treasury cited several factors for the cancellation including: high costs to 
the consumer, that CCS was not yet cost-efficient, the competition would not necessarily 
yield future CCS expansion, and "there were better uses for the £1 billion" (NAO, 2017). 
In reviewing lessons from the experience, however, the National Audit Office (NAO) 
argued there were numerous flaws in the process including in the design of the 
mechanism to support operating costs of CCS, the lack of any agreement between DECC 
and Treasury over costs, and that numerous stakeholders believed that government needs 
to carry more risk to make CCS more affordable to consumers, Ultimately, the NAO 
argued that the £168 million government spent over the course of the two competitions 
did not deliver value for money. 
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2.5. Energy and Climate at the Local Level: Edinburgh, Aberdeen, and Peterhead  
We employ focus groups and citizens’ juries to answer a series of interrelated questions 
on climate policy, renewable energy, and other low-carbon energy technologies in 
Scotland. We seek to understand the extent of the public’s awareness of ongoing debates 
related to climate policy and the impact of wider concerns over energy affordability, 
energy security, and climate change.   
 
We conducted our research in three locations: Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Peterhead, each 
of which offers a quite distinct local context. Edinburgh, a city of 500,000, is the capital 
of Scotland and seat of the Scottish Government. As a center for banking, education and 
tourism, Edinburgh has one of the lowest unemployment rates and highest rates of high-
skilled occupations (and GVA per capita) of major British cities (Edinburgh City 
Council, 2019).  
 
Aberdeen is the third largest city in Scotland with a population of roughly 200,000, which 
has long been the hub for the oil and gas industry in the Northern North Sea and is often 
described as the Oil Capital of Europe. After boom years in the 1980s and 1990s, when it 
became a major international center for oilfield services, the future of Aberdeen is closely 
associated with the dwindling production from the North Sea. Although extraction of the 
remaining reserves and decommissioning still offer some opportunities, there has been a 
widespread recognition that Aberdeen faces an existential threat without rethinking its 
strategy, although energy remains a top priority. A recent regional innovation agenda 
developed by the city of Aberdeen and surrounding Aberdeenshire shows four of the top 
seven priorities involve energy (Aberdeen City Council et al, 2018). The first action listed 
in the regional economic plan is to ‘Capitalise on our reputation as a global centre of 
excellence for subsea and underwater engineering and decommissioning.’ Later elements 
expand the definition of energy to include ‘supply chain development in alternative 
energies (including renewables and CCS/hydrogen action plan)’.   
 
Finally, Peterhead is a town of 18,000 in Aberdeenshire, north of Aberdeen and is the 
largest fishing community in the UK but is considerably poorer than Aberdeenshire 
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overall (£25,800 versus £37,000) (Aberdeenshire Council, 2017). There is a large gas-
fired power plant in the center of town run by SSE, which would have been the source of 
CO2 in both the first and second CCS projects. The Shell Peterhead project would have 
been a major local employer, with an average of 400 people employed on site, rising to 
600 at peak construction (Cotton et al, 2017). Shell began stakeholder engagement for its 
CCS project in 2012 “in a relatively lowkey and informal way” until late 2013 “when it 
became more proactive” by appointing “a part-time Community Liaison Officer” who 
was meant to be familiar with the region and local stakeholders leading what it described 
as a ‘diverse and extensive range of mechanisms’ for stakeholder engagement (Shell, 
2016). 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Focus Groups 
We conducted four focus groups in January 2017 with 36 citizens. Two focus groups 
were conducted in Peterhead (n=10 and n=9), one in Aberdeen (n=8), and one in 
Edinburgh (n=9). Participants were recruited by Ipsos MORI, an international market 
research firm.  Focus groups provide the opportunity for group discussion and can yield a 
range of ideas and opinions in a more natural setting than one-on-one interviews 
(Liamputtong, 2011). Potential downsides of focus groups are that discussion may be 
relatively superficial, and dominant individuals may influence some of the responses of 
other group members (Krueger and Casey, 2015). Our focus groups were comprised of 
individuals from different age groups, social grades, educational background, 
employment status, and opinions on climate change (Table 1). 
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3.2. Citizens’ Juries 
 
Citizens’ juries aim to provide policymakers with recommendations from individuals that 
are representative of the general public. A group of 15 to 20 citizens are presented with 
information from experts, complete a series of deliberative activities, and then produce 
recommendations, which can be fed into the policy process (Crosby et al., 1986). By 
keeping the group moderate in size, perspectives can be explored in depth through group 
discussions (Smith and Wales, 2000). The opportunity to perform a variety of activities 
over the course of several days provides advantages over focus groups or surveys by 
offering extensive opportunity for deliberation. Although cost is often a constraint, this 
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methodology has been used in numerous environmental decision-making processes (Irvin 
and Stansbury, 2004). Moreover, in the UK context, the need to bring greater deliberation 
into environmental policy debates has long been highlighted (RCEP, 1998)   
 
We conducted two citizens' juries in January and February 2017 following the initial 
focus groups. The juries took place over two consecutive Saturdays in Edinburgh (n=19), 
and in Aberdeen (n=19). Ipsos MORI recruited the panelists, moderated the sessions, and 
transcribed the focus groups and citizens’ juries. We sought to ensure diversity in gender, 
age, social grade, educational background, employment status, and opinion on climate 
change (Table 2). 
 
 
3.3 Data collection 
Focus groups were 90 minutes in duration – after some introductory discussion, an expert 
speaker provided a 10-minute presentation on low-carbon technologies, with a particular 
focus on CCS, followed by the opportunity to ask the speaker questions. The focus group 
concluded with discussion on the current energy situation in Scotland, the future of oil 
and gas production, renewable energy, and CCS. Short written questionnaires were 
administered upon arrival and after concluding the session. 
 
Citizens’ juries took place over a period of two days and explored the focus group themes 
in greater depth. Each day of the jury lasted approximately six hours. Five questionnaires 
 16 
were administered – upon arrival, between activities, and at the end. During the initial 
icebreaker activity, participants were asked which words or phrases came to mind when 
thinking about energy in Scotland, and challenges they perceived Scotland faced in 
regard to energy. Next, the jury broke into two groups to discuss those challenges in 
greater depth and presented findings back to the full jury. A presentation on the current 
Scottish energy supply was delivered by an expert speaker, followed by a question and 
answer (Q&A) session. The jury discussed factors to consider when developing an energy 
policy in Scotland. A second expert speaker gave a presentation on low-carbon energy 
technologies including renewables, nuclear, and CCS. After Q&A with the second expert 
speaker, the day concluded with a summary, and final thoughts on day one.  
 
Day two of the citizens' jury began with an introduction and recap of day one, followed 
by the third and final expert presentation on the future of Scottish energy systems 
followed by Q&A. The jurors broke into pairs to discuss their current opinions. The full 
jury then participated in forming an opinion grid along two axes “many risks” versus 
“few risks” and “many opportunities” versus “few opportunities.” Jurors began by 
standing in the center of the room, and for each option (onshore wind, offshore wind, 
nuclear, and CCS), moved to the part of the room that reflected their opinion of that 
technology. The jury then broke into small groups to discuss the most important factors to 
consider when developing an energy policy for Scotland. The moderators divided the 
factors into several themes. The jurors discussed why each factor was important and 
voted for the top five factors within each theme. Next, the jury then broke into small 
groups to discuss the recommendations they would give to the Scottish Government and 
presented their recommendations for the rest of the jury to react and comment. Each full 
jury voted on the recommendations they would give the Scottish Government.  
 
4. Results 
We completed our thematic analysis of the transcripts of the citizens’ jury and focus 
group sessions using NVivo. Recurring themes or ideas within the transcription were 
highlighted and assigned a code. The list of codes was then streamlined, condensed, and 
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the transcription was reviewed again (Saldana, 2009). The subtitles below reflect the 
major themes. 
 
4.1. Focus groups in Peterhead, Aberdeen and Edinburgh 
4.1.1. Scotland’s Declining Oil and Gas Industry 
Participants in all focus group locations perceived oil and gas to be a finite resource and 
had witnessed the impact of the declining oil and gas industry in Scotland. In Peterhead, 
residents stated that the oil and gas industry was "extremely important," particularly to 
the local economy in the Northeast of Scotland. Job loss was a major topic in the 
Peterhead focus groups, with several contributors providing anecdotes about job losses in 
their community: 
 
“...it's not just been that industry, for example, my lass works in a nursery 
near [area] and they have to get rid of their staff because their kid’s parents 
have lost jobs and so have had to move” (Peterhead). 
 
Topics such as "lower wages," falling house prices, and shop closures were also 
mentioned in Peterhead. One Aberdeen participant noted that "lots" of people were losing 
their jobs. Although there were fewer explicit mentions in Edinburgh of job losses, 
several noticed the effects on the declining oil and gas industry on the rest of the 
economy. However, some noted that conflicting information from government made it 
difficult to understand exactly how much oil and gas remained. 
 
4.1.2. Climate Change and Renewable Energy 
In all focus group locations, participants expressed a desire to conserve the environment 
for posterity: 
 
“I think climate change is such an important issue. We are worried about 
the risks of this, but we already know the risks of climate change and we 
should just try and do anything that we can to make any change” 
(Edinburgh). 
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There were several participants from Peterhead who were concerned that a 
transition to renewable energy sources could reduce job opportunities for people 
working in the oil and gas industry. Still, a large majority of citizens in all four 
focus groups viewed the transition to renewable energy sources positively and 
thought that more should be done by the government to expand renewable energy 
production. In Edinburgh, one contributor described other European countries as 
being more proactive in expanding their own renewable energy portfolios than the 
UK: 
 
“I think there has been quite a lot of missed opportunities in the UK 
especially in regards to wind, and if you look at somewhere like Germany 
they have really like made a real effort to support new types of energy…” 
(Edinburgh). 
 
Overall, despite (or perhaps because of) the Scottish government having adopted a much 
more positive regulatory regime to support onshore wind, feelings towards onshore 
windfarms were somewhat negative due to appearance and noise while feelings towards 
offshore windfarms were generally neutral or positive. 
 
4.1.3. CCS 
In all three locations, awareness of CCS was very low. A majority of participants had not 
heard of CCS before, and had "no idea" what it was, while a small number stated they 
had heard the term but were not aware of any specifics about what the term meant. 
Peterhead residents were almost completely unfamiliar with the technology, despite the 
fact that the town had been the preferred location for a major CCS demonstration plant, 
which would have brought in significant investment. Only one participant (out of 19) in 
the two Peterhead focus groups was aware of CCS on a project-specific level and was 
able to provide concrete information about CCS (see Table 3). 
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Table 3. Overall perceptions of CCS in Scotland and in Peterhead by focus group 
 
Table 4. Perceived problems associated with CCS for the four focus groups 
 
Once information was presented about CCS, questions arose related to the longevity, 
management, and safety of CCS projects (Table 4). Some Aberdeen residents wanted to 
understand how long it would take for the storage area to "fill up” and questioned 
whether the storage site would need to be "constantly" managed. However, the primary 
concern about CCS related to its safety. In Edinburgh, there was concern about whether a 
CO2 leak could have a negative impact on sea life, and potentially affect the fishing 
industry. Safety concerns, including concern about potential risk of explosion, were the 
leading consideration and were echoed by a majority of those involved: 
“Is it safe stored? Obviously with the layers and everything on top, yes, but 
what if anything happens to it? For example, my flat is sinking slightly, 
apparently. What happens if the ground starts sinking and it's all released at 
once? That could be disastrous for the environment” (Aberdeen). 
Despite these concerns, a majority in all focus groups considered CCS to be an option 
worth pursuing. Rationales for supporting CCS included environmental benefits, making 
use of existing infrastructure, and potentially providing job opportunities. Those most 
supportive saw the potential for CCS to reduce environmental impacts for posterity. 
Participants in the first Peterhead focus group indicated that they believed it would be 
beneficial for the existing infrastructure to be repurposed for CCS: 
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 “[The pipelines] are already in place, they are on the ground already, so 
why not use them, if they put money towards using them in the future” 
(Peterhead). 
Several Aberdeen residents were interested in learning whether oil and gas workers might 
be able to obtain employment from CCS project development. They identified CCS as a 
potential means of increasing the number of jobs in the region. 
 
4.1.4. The Role of Individuals and Companies in Reducing Emissions 
The role individuals and companies could play in conserving the environment and 
reducing emissions also received attention. Panelists in Aberdeen and Edinburgh thought 
more should be done to educate the general public about the environment. In both 
Aberdeen and Peterhead, several participants pointed out that individuals could do more 
to minimize their personal impact through measures such as saving electricity and 
purchasing items that are more energy-efficient.  
 
The Peterhead focus groups also believed it would be helpful if consumers were provided 
with more information on their electricity and heating use. They were unsure of their 
current energy use but felt could use this type of information to reduce their impact. 
Participants, particularly those in both Peterhead focus groups, believed that the oil and 
gas industry should bear greater responsibility for reducing emissions by taxing 
companies for producing CO2 rather than funding CCS from taxpayers:  
 
“Put it back to the folk that are causing it” (Peterhead). 
 
4.2. Citizens’ Juries in Aberdeen and Edinburgh 
4.2.1. Energy Challenges in Scotland 
During the opening discussions of each jury, participants divided into two groups to 
explore the energy challenges facing Scotland and the top three challenges identified by 
each group (Table 3). In Edinburgh, the top three challenges identified by group one 
included rising costs, declining fossil fuel resources, and Scotland’s energy 
independence: 
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“…oil is a finite resource. No matter how much of it there is, eventually it will 
run out… I think it's good the Scotland is becoming more reliant on windfarms, 
turbine energy, solar energy. You know, basing everything on oil is quite 
foolhardy in my opinion” (Edinburgh). 
 
 
Table 5. Energy Challenges in Scotland by Citizen Jury Group 
 
Other themes discussed but not selected as one of the top three challenges included 
renewable energy, technological development, growing demand, safety, concerns about 
Brexit, and the need to involve scientists in the policymaking process. 
 
Group two in Edinburgh struggled to decide upon the top three challenges, but discussion 
primarily focused on cost, the environment, saving energy, safety, finding the right 
energy provider, recycling, and energy independence: 
 
“I think cost is definitely the first thing. I'm definitely interested in the 
environment, but I think overall cost would have to come first.” (Edinburgh). 
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A key topic of discussion in group two was finding an affordable energy provider. Jurors 
expressed uncertainty on how to find an “environmentally friendly” energy provider. 
 
When the two groups merged to discuss their findings, corporate accountability emerged 
as a key challenge. One concern shared by several participants focused on energy tariffs: 
 
“Everybody has got different costings… people live next door and there’s a 
completely different price. So, they have to be held accountable for how they 
sell the product…” (Edinburgh). 
 
In Aberdeen, the top three challenges group one decided on were: (i) decommissioning in 
the North Sea, (ii) fracking (specifically safety and environmental impacts), and (iii) 
energy affordability. The greatest concerns in Aberdeen, perhaps unsurprisingly, related 
to the fate of the North Sea oil and gas industry, and whether companies would simply 
leave and in what manner:  
 
“I mean, if all the oil companies have been making these massive profits for 
like 30 or 40 years are they going to be putting that funding back into 
decommission the rigs effectively, or are they going to do what they do in other 
countries and just, you know, put like a little cap over it and see you later kind 
of thing. If you look at what oil companies have done in other countries that 
have allowed them to do it, they just go in and wreck the place...” (Aberdeen). 
 
Concerns were raised over the safety of fracking and its environmental impacts, citing the 
US where fracking was having negative impacts on water systems. Group one also 
discussed recycling, potential energy rationing, transportation, economic efficiency of 
different energy resources, renewable energy, and energy independence.  
 
In group two in Aberdeen, the top three challenges they perceived were: (i) the impacts of 
transitioning to renewable energy sources including both cost and environmental impacts, 
(ii) the implications of Brexit, and (iii) training the workforce to utilize new technologies. 
 23 
 
“…we're coming out of the single market, so we buy a lot of our energy from 
abroad, from Europe, so it's I guess a case of are they going to charge us more? 
Are we as a nation going to have to pay more, or are we going to invest in more 
renewable energy for ourselves?” (Aberdeen). 
 
Other topics of discussion included the availability of gas, coal-fired power plants, 
renewable energy including nuclear, foreign investment in North Sea oil, energy storage 
and distribution to remote areas, and energy costs.  
 
During the full group discussion, jurors realized they shared many of the same concerns. 
Additionally, energy affordability, particularly for those in poverty, was something many 
felt should be addressed:  
 
“…It shouldn't be a case of not having a meal to turn the heating on.” 
(Aberdeen). 
 
Citizens noted that government promotion of a technology did not necessarily mean it 
would come without risks. They were in agreement that there should be improved 
stakeholder engagement, and increased transparency from both companies and 
government. Very similar themes arose in both citizens juries, although the groups 
prioritized the energy challenges differently (Table 3). 
 
 
4.2.2. Survey Responses 
We administered surveys to jurors at multiple points in the process. Citizens in Edinburgh 
unsurprisingly did not find oil and gas extraction to be as important to the local area as 
citizens from Aberdeen. However, following the jury, citizens in both juries perceived 
continued oil and gas production from the North Sea to be less important (Figure 1). This 
may reflect information received about current and future energy prospects in Scotland 
subsequent to the deliberative process. Citizens were also asked before and after the jury 
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whether they accepted or opposed energy produced from a variety of sources. Following 
the jury, citizens in Edinburgh were slightly more in favor of energy from renewable 
sources than Aberdeen, while members of both juries expressed similar levels of 
acceptance for gas, and gas with CCS, that is, both juries saw slightly more than 50% in 
favor of gas, but relatively high levels of opposition of 30-40%, whereas gas with CCS 
had more don’t knows, leading to slightly lower levels of support but much lower levels 
of opposition (Figure 2). Opposition to renewables was notably higher in Aberdeen than 
the Edinburgh jury but also higher than would be typical in surveys of the Scottish public, 
where typical levels of support for wind and especially solar will be 80-90% (BEIS, 
2018b).  Opposition to renewables in Aberdeen is reminiscent of the finding of Butler at 
al (2011) of greater skepticism towards wind in communities with nuclear power stations.   
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4.2.3. Factors to Consider When Developing an Energy Policy for Scotland 
Prior to making recommendations, the juries discussed factors to consider when 
developing an energy policy for Scotland. This process took into account the challenges 
facing Scotland, information provided by the expert speakers, and the pros and cons of 
different energy sources. 
 
In Edinburgh, the environment and renewable energy were the central themes of 
discussion driven by concerns over climate change. Participants perceived societal 
awareness of climate change to be low and called for improved education related to 
energy and climate change. There was agreement that creating a diverse energy portfolio 
should be a priority supported by subsidies and incentives for renewable energy 
development: 
 
“… if people want to put solar panels on their house or even a windmill in 
their back garden or whatever, I think the subsidy needs to be much more 
generous than they are now…” (Edinburgh). 
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Edinburgh jurors were not convinced that companies were being penalized sufficiently 
for inflicting damage upon the environment and favored a higher carbon tax and were 
concerned about consistency in government policy: 
 
“Sometimes one government goes out, another government comes in, oh I 
don't like that policy, bin. I don't like that policy, bin. Nobody seems to be 
looking at the big picture” (Edinburgh). 
 
This perception translated into one of the main recommendations presented by the group 
of the need for policy continuity, echoing the Climate Change Committee’s recent report 
(CCC, 2018a).  
 
In Aberdeen, citizens also supported a diversified energy portfolio, stating that reliance 
on any one source of energy was unsustainable. 
 
“I think it's become clear that you can’t rely on one source, it's got to be a 
mix of everything that's available really” (Aberdeen).  
 
In discussing various energy options including nuclear, wind, oil, gas, and fracking, the 
theme of safety arose. Although some were in favor of nuclear energy as a “consistent” 
and “reliable” energy source, others were concerned about safety, nuclear waste storage, 
and decommissioning. Fracking, in particular, was viewed as posing risks not worth 
taking. 
 
“Public safety is important... all the standards really need to be kept top 
notch for safety because they don't want either a nuclear power plant 
accident or Piper Alpha like accident, or even a dam bursting accident.  That 
would be bad. So, really public safety is a top priority” (Aberdeen). 
 
Many wanted clearer information from companies and government about how their 
energy was being produced, where it came from, and the profits companies were making. 
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Citizens thought government could do a better job educating the public about energy and 
engaging them in the decision-making process. Finally, the Aberdeen jury perceived both 
environmental impact and cost as important factors to consider but were concerned that 
they may be in competition. This was reflected in the final questionnaire responses – in 
Aberdeen, an equal number of participants ranked environment and cost as most 
important, while in Edinburgh, most people ranked environment first. 
 
On the second day of the jury, citizens in each jury wrote down the factors they believed 
should be considered, which were then grouped into themes by the facilitators. This 
created a final list of unranked factors participants should consider before making their 
recommendations (Table 6). 
 
 
Table 6. Factors to consider when developing an energy policy in Scotland 
 
4.2.4. Citizens’ Jury Recommendations for the Scottish Government 
Towards the end of the second day of deliberations, each jury developed a set of ranked 
recommendations for the Scottish government (Table 7). Although the juries were 
conducted independently in two distinct locations, the recommendations had many 
commonalities: government commitment to climate and environmental policy, a diverse 
(renewable-dominated) energy portfolio, and nationalization of Scotland’s energy, with 
profits being fed back into local communities or research and development (R&D).  
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Table 7. Citizens Jury Recommendations for the Scottish government 
* Received the same number of votes 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Public support for nationalization of Scotland’s energy resources was a key finding of the 
citizens’ juries, which appears to stem in part from a lack of trust in energy companies 
and a desire for energy-related profits to benefit local communities or support R&D. 
These findings align with the UK government public attitudes tracker, which found that 
the majority (53%) of the British public do not trust energy providers; Scottish 
respondents were very slightly less negative with 48% not trusting their energy providers, 
with only 4% expressing a lot of trust (BEIS, 2018b). In our consultations, participants 
called for greater transparency from energy companies and for profits to be redirected to 
projects that were seen as better serving the people. 
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In all focus groups and citizens’ juries, there was strong support for Scotland having a 
diversified energy portfolio involving a significant share of renewable energy sources. 
Even in Aberdeen, where the local economy is highly reliant on fossil fuel extraction, 
there was widespread acknowledgement that the oil and gas industry was in decline and 
renewable energy production needed to be expanded. Citizens were also supportive of 
Scotland developing initiatives and incentives to increase renewable energy production 
on a local level, which aligns with Scotland’s Energy Strategy goal of increasing local 
energy production. 
 
Finally, most participants expressed support for further R&D for CCS technologies. 
Support stemmed from environmental concerns, making use of existing infrastructure 
from the oil and gas industry, and potentially providing job opportunities in communities 
located in proximity to the North Sea. The primary reservations related to costs 
associated with CCS and concerns about safety. Despite support for further R&D, 
citizens did not think it was appropriate for Scottish citizens bearing the costs of CCS 
projects while they perceived the oil and gas industry to be profiting from damaging the 
environment and lacking transparency with consumers. They also wanted the safety of 
CCS to be firmly established. In-depth interviews conducted in Scotland with informed 
members of the public on CCS have found that “many people in the sample struggled to 
see the point of CCS” and would rather see further investment in renewable energy 
sources (Mabon et al., 2014).  
 
Previous studies have used deliberative processes to explore views on renewable energy 
and other low-carbon technologies in Scotland. A large group workshop held in 2011 in 
Edinburgh found strong support for renewable energy and pride in Scotland’s 
achievements (Howell et al., 2014). During 2013 and 2014, three Scottish citizens’ juries 
were conducted on wind power generation. Although the juries were held in diverse 
locations (one near an existing wind farm, another near a proposed wind farm, and the 
third in a location without a wind farm), generally, members of the juries felt climate 
change was an important issue and were supportive of renewable energy (Roberts and 
Escobar, 2015). 
 30 
 
Other studies on CCS have found similar concerns about the safety of CCS. In 2012, 
prior to the second CCS competition, four focus groups conducted in London found low 
levels of public awareness of CCS. Once provided with some information about CCS, 
members of the public expressed concern about its safety, likening it to nuclear (Lock et 
al., 2014). However, having expert(s) available during our engagement exercises to 
answer questions related to CCS safety may have alleviated some concerns members of 
the public had about the technology. 
 
Awareness of CCS was low in our study, where even in Peterhead itself only one member 
of the public knew about Shell’s proposed project, despite claims of successful local 
outreach (Shell, 2016). Such failure to gain public attention even after more than a decade 
of proposed large-scale projects highlights the challenge of public engagement even in 
the most propitious setting. Of course inattention is better than outright opposition – in 
Barendrecht, the site of another proposed CCS project by Shell near Rotterdam, members 
of the public were not only aware of the project, but many had strongly negative 
perceptions of it primarily related to its safety, but also perceived potential negative 
impacts on property value, sentiments that they had not been consulted enough in the 
decision-making process, and distrust in Shell and the national government (Terwel et al., 
2012). We only spoke with 19 randomly selected members of the public, so we should 
take care to avoid claims of representativeness. Nevertheless, the almost complete lack of 
awareness in Peterhead, a relatively poor town of approximately 18,000 people, of a 
project that would have resulted in up to a billion dollars of public funding and hundreds 
of jobs raises questions about the level of public engagement that occurred during the 
competition.  
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The IPCC “Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°” indicates global greenhouse gas 
emissions must be reduced by approximately 45% from 2010 baseline levels by 2030 to 
avoid the most catastrophic effects of global climate change (IPCC, 2018). Despite its 
abundance of fossil fuel resources, Scotland has notably achieved 47% emissions 
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reduction over two decades, approaching the rate at which the rest of the world will need 
to decarbonize as we approach 2030. Development of onshore wind production in 
particular has enabled Scotland to achieve 74.6% of its electricity from renewable energy 
sources.  By contrast, England has effectively banned onshore wind and so overall UK 
progress in meeting its renewable targets has been notably slower and less ambitious than 
that of Scotland.  
 
It is clear that lessons can be learned from Scotland’s approach and could be applied 
elsewhere.  One would expect tensions between existing economic and political interests 
in continuing to produce and consume fossil fuels versus ambitious plans to decarbonize 
would be particularly prominent in Scotland, which has been dependent upon revenues 
and employment from fossil fuel extraction. However, we learned through our series of 
public engagement exercises that the general public supported funding local renewable 
energy production, even, perhaps surprisingly, in communities historically reliant on jobs 
provided by the fossil fuel industry. The transition in energy-reliant communities may 
therefore be easier in energy-rich regions than presumed if these communities continue to 
see other viable local options (consider wind in Texas, geothermal in Indonesia or solar in 
the Persian Gulf). Moreover, despite the long history of energy firms being involved in 
communities such as Aberdeen, we found relatively little affection or goodwill and a 
good deal of skepticism about energy firms, which was not noticeably different from the 
views heard in more-distant communities such as Edinburgh.  Nationalism and the 
potential for state intervention in the energy sector is found to be appealing in Scotland as 
well, which is partly driven by wider political forces but also by the perception that many 
energy companies are not acting in the interests of the environment or consumers.  Our 
findings challenge the presumptions about the inevitable dominance of certain 
longstanding interest groups or the preference for private rather than public ownership.   
 
Low-carbon technologies, such as CCS, may be critical for Scotland and other countries 
to achieve future emissions reduction targets. CCS has been seen as offering a lifeline to 
the oil and gas industry and therefore Aberdeen and surroundings would seem to be the 
ideal location for such a project and yet Shell’s Peterhead project was cancelled with 
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relatively few repercussions. While members of the public in Scotland are generally 
supportive of CCS, most people are reluctant for its funding to come from taxpayers and 
would prefer for the “polluter” (i.e., oil and gas companies) to pay. Additionally, many of 
the participants expressed concerns about the safety of CCS. Although the series of CCS 
project cancellations can be ascribed to various reasons, it is also clear that the almost 
complete lack of awareness of CCS even in a community such as Peterhead that stood to 
benefit from significant public and private investments is a sign of the evident weakness 
of the effort to engage with local communities.  Greater awareness might have been able 
to offer the projects potential wellsprings of support.  Firms and governments seeking to 
deploy CCS plants will obviously need to consider the economic and technical 
challenges, but our findings indicate that it would also be important for greater developer 
engagement with local communities, not simply to ensure social license to operate, but 
also as a means of proactively garnering political backing for such projects. 
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